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Labor Law-A Balancing of Interests Test Applied to the Duty
to Bargain About a Partial Closing Decision: First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB
Sections 8 and 9 of the National Labor Relations Act' impose upon both
employers and certified representatives of employees a duty to bargain collec-
tively with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment."'2 In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 3 the Supreme
Court applied a "balancing of interests" test to the often litigated question of
what constitutes a "term or condition of employment" under the Act.4 The
Court concluded that an employer does not have a duty to bargain collectively
before making an economically motivated decision to shut down a discrete
portion of his maintenance operation.5 While the Court's analysis might indi-
cate that an employer would never have a duty to bargain with employees
prior to making such a major decision, the terms used in the balancing test are
of questionable origin, are inherently vague, and are left inadequately defined
in the opinion.6 Moreover, at the end of its decision the Court limited its
holding in a manner inconsistent with the per se rule it had just appeared to
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to
promote collective bargaining as a means of maintaining industrial peace so as to preserve the free
flow of interstate commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that an employer's refusal "to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)]" constitutes an unfair
labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
Section 8(b)(3) states that for a labor organization or its agents "to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions
of section [9(a)]" is an unfair labor practice. Id. § 159(a).
Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
Id. § 159(a).
Section 8(d) of the Act provides as follows:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession. ...
Id § 158(d). See also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (em-
ployer and union have duty to bargain in "good faith" over wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976); see supra note 1.
3. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
4. Id. at 679.
5. Id. at 680-86.
6. See infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
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adopt.7 Finally, the Court neglected to reconcile this decision with many of its
earlier pronouncements on the matter, leaving their continued applicability in
doubt.8 The Court's decision in First National is therefore more likely'to con-
fuse than to clarify the question of the scope of an employer's collective bar-
gaining duty.
First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM) had contracted to pro-
vide maintenance services for the Greenpark Care Center on a cost-plus-fixed-
fee basis.9 After the contract had been in effect for six months, Greenpark
reduced the weekly fee paid to FNM from $500 to $250; the business relation-
ship between the parties deteriorated steadily from that point. Eight months
later, on June 30, 1977, after learning that its Greenpark operation had be-
come unprofitable, FNM requested that the weekly fee be restored to $500.
Two weeks later it informed Greenpark that it would terminate the nursing
home operation effective August 1 unless the fee was restored. A telegram
providing final notice of termination was sent to Greenpark on July 25.
During the same time period the National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees was conducting an organizing campaign among FNM's
thirty-five Greenpark employees. A union victory resulted from an election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board; the election results were
certified on May 11, 1977. By letter of July 12, the union requested that FNM
meet with it in order to establish a collective bargaining agreement for the
employees of the Greenpark operation.
FNM never responded to that request, but it did notify the union on July
28, 1977, that FNM would discharge the Greenpark employees effective Au-
gust 1 when FNM terminated its Greenpark operation. The union's immedi-
ate efforts to forestall the termination and discharge were unsuccessful.' 0 On
July 31 FNM terminated the operation and discharged the employees as
planned. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge alleg-
ing that FNM had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
7. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
9. 452 U.S. at 668. The parties, First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM) and
Greenpark Care Center (Greenpark) entered into a written contract on April 28, 1976. The con-
tract specified that Greenpark would furnish all tools, equipment, materials and supplies, and
would pay FNM a weekly management fee of $500, plus the gross weekly payroll and fringe
benefits. Greenpark also agreed not to hire any FNM employees during the contract term and for
90 days thereafter. Id.
Greenpark was one of "between two and four" nursing homes that FNM had as customers.
Thirty-five of FNM's workers were employed there. Id. at 668 n.l. The administrative law judge
concluded that the Greenpark operation constituted only a small part of FNM's total operation.
First Nat'i, 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 465 (1979), aft'd, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666
(1981).
10. When notified that employees would be discharged, union vice- president Edward Weck-
er telephoned FNM's secretary-treasurer, Leonard Marsh, requesting that FNM delay closing to
allow for bargaining. Marsh refused. Additionally, a Greenpark representative refused to waive
the contract's 30-day notice provision which would allow FNM to continue operations. Greenpark
was also unwilling itself to hire the FNM employees because of the 90-day hiring ban in the
contract. Id. at 670.
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Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the union before closing its Green-
park operation.
The administrative law judge, relying on the Board's decision in Ozark
Trailers, Inc., I I held that FNM had violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
bargain regarding its decision to terminate the Greenpark operation.' 2 Except
for a minor change in the remedial order, the Board affirmed without further
analysis.13 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the Board's
order. It, however, rejected the position adopted by the administrative law
judge and the Board that an employer's refusal to bargain over a partial clos-
ing decision is per se violative of section 8(a)(5).14 Rather, the court held that
section 8(d) establishes a rebuttable presumption in favor of mandatory bar-
gaining; because FNM failed to rebut the presumption, the court enforced the
Board's remedial order.' 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that because
"the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding
whether to shut down part of its business for purely economic reasons out-
weighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's par-
ticipation in making the decision," the partial closing decision itself is not a
term or condition of employment within the meaning of section 8(d) and
therefore is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. t6
I1. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (employer has duty to bargain over decision to terminate one of
its several trucking depots).
12. First Nat'l, 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 466 (1979). The administrative law judge ruled that FNM
was not excused from its duty to bargain, because the closing of the Greenpark operation did not
involve a significant withdrawal of capital or a change in the scope or direction of the enterprise.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
13. 242 N.L.R.B. at 462.
14. First Nat', 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of
appeals, noted that the court erred in enforcing the Board's order on different grounds without
remanding the case to the Board for further examination of the evidence and fact-finding. 452
U.S. at 672 n.6 (citing NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 522 n.9 (1977) & SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)). The Court nevertheless chose to decide the case on its merits. Id at 672
n.6.
15. 627 F.2d at 601-03. After an extensive review of legal precedent and policy considera-
tions, the appeals court in First National agreed with the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB that section 8(d) establishes an initial
presumption that a partial closing decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 601 (citing
Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 735 (3d Cir. 1978)). The two courts dis-
agreed, however, on the manner in which employers could rebut that presumption. The Third
Circuit held that one must balance the interests of the parties themselves in deciding whether
bargaining should be required. Id. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that the pre-
sumption could be rebutted by showing that "the purposes of the statute would not be furthered
by the imposition of a duty to bargain." Id Notwithstanding the different standard applied by the
two courts, both required the same factual circumstances to justify an employer's refusal to bar-
gain. In particular, the courts looked to see if bargaining over the decision would be futile because
the employer had no alternative other than to close, if the decision was due to emergency circum-
stances, or if it was the custom of the industry to bargain over such decisions. rd at 601-02. See
also Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination of Operations: Brockwa), Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 92 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1979).
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this presumption analysis as "ill suited to advance
harmonious relations between employer and employee." 452 U.S. at 684.
16. 452 U.S. at 686. The Court made clear, however, that the employer must bargain about
the effects of such a decision. Id. at 677 n.15.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized that an important
purpose of collective bargaining is to further the goals of the Act by helping to
maintain industrial peace, thereby preserving the free flow of interstate com-
merce. 17 To that end, Congress enacted section 8(d) as a limit on the subjects
of mandatory bargaining, intending to include only issues that are part of the
relationship between management and labor.' 8 Congress did not intend for
the collective bargaining process to transform labor into "an equal partner in
the running of the business enterprise."' 9
The Court noted that the partial termination decision at issue was based
solely on the profitability of the Greenpark contract, a matter entirely unre-
lated to the labor-management relationship. 20 At the same time, however, the
decision had a direct impact on that relationship in the form of employee ter-
minations. In other words, while an aspect of the labor management relation-
ship was not a cause of the decision, the decision clearly affected that
relationship.2 '
The Court reasoned that partial closing decisions which lie outside the
employer-employee relationship but which have a direct impact thereupon
should be the subject of mandatory bargaining only when susceptible to reso-
lution through the collective bargaining process, because only then will the
goal of maintaining industrial peace be furthered. 22 To require bargaining in
other situations would be an unjustifiable encroachment on the freedom and
certainty in the decision-making process that management needs to conduct its
business in a profitable manner. 23 Accordingly, the Court set forth a balanc-
ing of interests approach: "[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substan-
tial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargain-
ing process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of business. ' '24
In applying this balancing test to the specific question of FNM's duty to
17. Id. at 674. See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937).
18. 452 U.S. at 674-75. See also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). The court noted that Congress intentionally chose not to define
the words "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," because it wanted to
leave to the Board the task of defining the terms in light of specific industrial practices. 452 U.S.
at 675 & n. 14.
19. 452 U.S. at 676.
20. Id. at 677.
21. Id. at 678-79.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Court noted that to label a matter a mandatory subject of bargaining does not
oblige either party to abandon its intentions or to agree with proposals advanced by the other
party. On proper subjects, however, the parties must meet with the other party, provide informa-
tion necessary to that party's understanding of the problem, and in good faith consider any propo-
sal that the other party advances. Id. at 678 n.17. The parties "may bargain to impasse on these
matters, and then use the economic weapons at their disposal in an attempt to secure their respec-
tive aims." Id. at 675; see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See generally Fleming, The Obligation to
Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (196 1); Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Tertnina-
tion-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 81 (1970).
24. 452 U.S. at 679. Moreover, the Court noted that the Fibreboard Court "implicitly" en-
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bargain about its economically motivated decision to close a portion of its
operation, the Court first assessed the benefit that would accrue to the collec-
tive bargaining process, in the form of an augmented flow of ideas, informa-
tion, and suggestions if union participation in the decision-making process
were mandated. Noting that the employer already has a duty to bargain with
the union over the effects of the partial shutdown decision,2 5 and that the
union's interest in bargaining over the decision itself would be the same as in
"effects bargaining"-job security-the Court concluded that requiring bar-
gaining over the decision itself would probably not augment the flow of infor-
mation. Consequently, there would be little benefit to the collective-
bargaining process by virtue of union participation.
26
In contrast, the degree to which management's interest in unencumbered
decision making would be affected by a mandated duty to bargain depends on
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the decision. 27 In this case,
however, the Court did not inquire into the particular interest of FNM that
would be burdened by a mandated bargaining duty. The Court did note, how-
ever, that to require an employer to bargain over a partial closing decision
could give the union a powerful coercive tool of delay to use against manage-
ment for reasons other than to further a feasible solution.28 In addition, evi-
dence of current labor practices, though only an indication of what is feasible
through collective bargaining, "supports the apparent imbalance weighing
against mandatory bargaining."'29 Finally, the Court concluded that the pre-
sumption analysis adopted by the court of appeals would not advance harmo-
nious relations between labor and management, because it failed to address
the latter's need for certainty in decision making.
30
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, noting that Con-
gress purposefully left the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in-
gaged in this same analysis. Id. (citing Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NRLB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964)). For a discussion of Fibreboard see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 681. (citing NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir.
1965), & NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011(1966)).
26. Id. The union's legitimate interest in fair dealing and job security is also protected by
section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which prohibits anti-union motivated partial closing effected to chill
unionism at the employer's other plants. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263 (1965).
As the Court noted in First National:
Under § 8(a)(3) the Board may inquire into the motivations behind the partial closing.
An employer may not simply shut down a part of its business and mask its desire to
weaken and circumvent the union by labeling its decision "purely economic." Thus, al-
though the union has a natural concern that a partial closing not be hastily or unnecessa-
rily entered into, it has some control over the effects of the decision and indirectly may
ensure that the decision itself is deliberately considered. It also has direct protection
against a partial closing decision that is motivated by an intent to harm a union.
452 U.S. at 682.
27. Id Management's concerns might include a need for "speed, flexibility and secrecy in
meeting business opportunities and exigencies." Bargaining might be futile, because management
has no feasible alternative other than to shut down the operation. Id. at 682-83.
28. Id. at 683.
29. Id. at 684.
30. Id.
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definite. Accordingly, more deference should be given to the Board's
conclusion that because a partial closing decision "clearly touches on a matter
of central and pressing concern to the union and its member employees, [it] is
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."'3 1 He also questioned how the
Court's balancing test could foster the neutral purposes of the Act when it
takes into account only management's interest in making unfettered economi-
cally motivated decisions.32 Finally, even if the balancing test is theoretically
correct, the Court based its application here not on fact, but on mere specula-
tion. Justice Brennan therefore believed that the presumption approach
adopted by the court of appeals was appropriate. 33
Until 1965 employers were generally considered to have no duty to bar-
gain with the union concerning economically motivated partial closing, partial
relocation, and subcontracting decisions.34 Failure to bargain over such deci-
sions was questioned only if the decision was motivated by antiunion animus,
and then usually as an 8(a)(3) violation rather than as a violation of section
8(a)(5).35
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 36 the Supreme Court held,
notwithstanding an absence of antiunion motivation, that an employer had a
duty under section 8(a)(5) to bargain with the union before replacing "employ-
ees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to
do the same work under similar conditions of employment. '37 Although the
decision was expressly limited to its facts, 38 Chief Justice Warren's majority
opinion reasoned broadly that this result was justified because the subject mat-
ter of the dispute was within the "literal meaning" of the phrase "terms and
conditions of employment."'3 9 Moreover, including "replacement decisions"
31. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 686 n.22.
33. Id. at 690-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. See Murphy, Plant Relocation andthe Collective Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C.L. REV. 5,
7-8 (1980); Schwarz, supra note 23, at 82-83. For an in-depth study of this area before Fi'reboard,
see Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain about Subcontracting and Other "Management" Deci-
sions, 64 COLLM. L. REV. 294, 301-03 (1964).
35. See Schwarz, supra note 23, at 82-83. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act provides that it shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976).
36. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
37. Id. at 215. For discussions ofthe development of the law regarding an employer's duty to
bargain, see Murphy, supra note 34; Schwarz, supra note 23; Comment, supra note 34; Labor
Law-National Labor Relations Act-In a Partial Closing, the Interests of the Parties Must Be
Balanced to Determine "/hether The Closing is 4 Mandatory Subject of Bargaining-Brockway
Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1979).
38. The Court stated as follows:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, on the facts of this case, the "contracting out"
of work previously performed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject
about which the National Labor Relations Act requires employers and the representa-
tives of their employees to bargain collectively.
379 U.S. at 209.
39. Id. at 210. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), a case involving an employer's duty to bargain about a
partial closing decision under § 152 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976). The Court
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within the scope of collective bargaining would help effectuate the purpose of
the Act, as evidenced by the prevalence of provisions dealing with this ques-
tion in existing collective bargaining agreements.40 Finally, the decision to
replace employees with an independent contractor did not alter the basic scope
of the company's operation, nor did it involve a significant investment of capi-
tal. Imposition of a duty to bargain about such a decision therefore would not
significantly abridge the employer's freedom to manage his business.4'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, alarmed by the potentially broad
implications of the majority opinion, stressed the narrow holding in which he
joined.42 He noted that not every decision affecting job security is necessarily
a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. Congress did not intend the bar-
gaining duty under section 8(d) to encroach on those management decisions
that lie "at the core of entrepreneurial control" and "which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise." 43
Notwithstanding Fibreboard's narrow holding and the Court's later deci-
sion in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,44
the National Labor Relations Board initially construed Fibreboard broadly.45
In its leading post-Fibreboard case, Ozark Trailers, Inc.,46 the Board held that
an employer had a per se duty to bargain with the union before deciding to
close one of its trucking depots. The Board gradually retreated from this
broad rule, however, holding that under certain circumstances an employer
had no duty to bargain about a closing decision.47 At the present time, the
in that case held that the union's desire to negotiate was not "an unlawful bargaining demand."
362 U.S. at 340-4I. In First National, amicus AFL-CIO argued that the Order oRailroad Telegra-
phers decision mandated a similar result here. 452 U.S. at 686-87 n.23. The Court rejected the
argument, reasoning that "[t]he mandatory scope of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act...
[is] not coextensive with the National Labor Relations Act and the Board's jurisdiction over unfair
labor practices." Id. (citations omitted).
40. 379 U.S. at 210-12.
41. Id. at 213.
42. Id. at 217-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 223.
44. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). The Court there held that an employer has an absolute right to
terminate his entire business without violating § 8(a)(3) of the Act even if done with anti-union
motivation. A partial termination motivated by anti-union animus is a violation of that section,
however, if done to "chill unionism" at one of the employer's remaining plants, and if the em-
ployer reasonably could have foreseen that the closing would have that effect. Id at 275.
The Darlington Court was not presented with the question of a partial closing motivated only
by economic considerations. Nevertheless, some lower courts have relied on language in that case
to hold that an employer's refusal to -bargain over such a decision is not a violation of § 8(a)(5).
See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970)(no
§ 8(a)(5) violation absent concurrent violation of § 8(a)(3)). The Board, on the other hand, has
held that Darlington is inapplicable in cases arising under § 8(a)(5). See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. 561, 565 (1966); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 619, 622 (1965).
45. See Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for
Standards in Defining the Scope o/Duty to Bargain; 71 COLuM. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1971). See
generally Note, Duty to Bargain: Subcontracting, Relocation, and Partial Termination, 55 GEO. L.J.
879 (1967).
46. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966). See supra note 11.
47. See, e.g., General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 951-52
(1971), ajf'dsub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (transfer of truck retail sale
and servicing facility termed "sale" of business and a decision "at the core of entrepreneurial
control"); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 480 (1972) (decision to close subsidiary not a
1983]
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Board seems to apply a presumption of a duty to bargain; 48 an employer can
rebut that presumption by showing that management's interest in not bargain-
ing outweighs the employees' countervailing interest in participating in the
decision-making process. 49 The Board has tended to treat subcontracting, par-
tial closing, and relocation decisions as identical for purposes of analyzing an
employer's duty to bargain.50
In contrast, the courts of appeal have generally been less willing to apply
Fibreboard beyond its narrow fact situation.- t Only the Fifth Circuit has
agreed totally with the Board's per se approach. 52 The Second 53 and Third
Circuits54 have applied a presumption analysis but disagree over how the em-
ployer may rebut the inference of a duty to bargain about the decision itself.5
The Eight, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have rejected the
Board's broad application of Fibreboard, relying in large part on the narrow
holding of the case, the language of Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, and
the rationale of the Court's holding in Darlington Manufacturing Co. 5 6
The Supreme Court agreed to hear First National for the specific purpose
of resolving this conflict between the Board and the courts of appeal.57 One
would have hoped that the Court would set forth a clear and concise method
of analysis. Instead, it set forth a "balancing of interests" test that weighs
questionable interests couched in terms left inherently vague and inadequately
defined.58 Moreover, the Court applied its test in a manner suggesting that an
employer never has a duty to bargain over an economically-motivated deci-
sion to shut down its plant, 59 but then proceeded to limit its holding in a man-
mandatory subject of bargaining because "its practical effect was to take the Respondent out of
the business of manufacturing tool and tooling products").
48. See, e.g., Broods-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 476, 477 (1979). But see First Nat'l, 242
N.L.R.B. 462 (1979); see supra note 13.
49. See Raskin Packing Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 78, 84 (1979).
50. See Schwarz, supra note 23, at 91 n.66.
51. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 17-18.
52. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966)(holding an employer's decision to discontinue cheese cutting and packing operation to be
mandatory subject of bargaining because part of larger warehouse operation). The position of the
District of Columbia Circuit is unclear. See International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v.
NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
53. First Nat'l, 627 F.2d at 601-02. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have agreed with the
Second Circuit. Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980); but see concurring & dissenting
opinion accusing majority of using per se rule, 617 F.2d at 1274 (Pell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979).
54. Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 582 F.2d at 735.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 672 n.7.
56. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits (see infra notes 64 & 65) have generally held that
an employer has no duty to bargain over a management decision involving a major commitment
in capital investment or a basic change in the scope of its operation. See., e.g., NLRB v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698
(10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1011 (1966). See also Rabin, supra note 45, at 810-12.
57. 452 U.S. at 672-74.
58. See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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ner inconsistent with the broad analysis it employed. 60 Finally, the Court
neglected to reconcile its decision with several of its earlier pronouncements
on the question.6' Therefore, while a pragmatic result was reached, confusion
among the lower courts probably will follow, just as confusion followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard.62
In First National the Court adopted a balancing-of-interests test designed
to effectuate the "neutral purposes" of the Act.63 But as the dissenters argued,
the test adopted by the majority is flawed because it considers only the inter-
ests of management.64 After all, how can a test that fails to consider the inter-
ests of one of the two parties involved purport to further the neutral purposes
of the Act?6 5 Moreover, as the Court itself argued, section 8(d) of the Act
establishes a limit on the subjects of mandatory bargaining: Congress intended
to include "only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and employee. ' '6 6
One might argue that the Court's balancing approach in fact considers the
interests of the bargaining unit employees, albeit indirectly. Expanding on an
aspect of its analysis in Fibreboard, the Court noted in First National that the
purpose of mandatory collective bargaining is to promote the purposes of the
Act by subjecting labor/management disputes to a peaceful forum and thereby
encouraging the flow of information and ideas about the interests of both par-
ties in the decision. 67 The Court concluded, however, that the union's interest
in bargaining over a partial closing decision is the same as its interest in "ef-
fects bargaining"-job security. 68 Therefore, to require the employer to bar-
gain with respect to the closing decision itself, in addition to the effects of that
decision, would do little to "augment this flow of information and
60. See ilfra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
62. Compare Ozark Industries, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (per se duty to bargain over
truck depot closing decision), with NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.
1980) (no duty to bargain if decision involves significant commitment of investment capital). See
Murphy, supra note 34, at 14-15 n.61.
63. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)(where state statute regu-
lates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, statute will be upheld unless burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to local benefit).
64. 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court itself has stated that the employees'
interests are to be considered in determining mandatory subjects of bargaining. The objectives of
national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to arrange their businesses and even to eliminate themselves
as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the
employment relationship. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964). But see
Darling/on Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 270. ("A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to
go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial prece-
dent so construing the Labor Relations Act.").
65. 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 676 (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) & making incorrect reference to § 8(a)).
67. 452 U.S. at 680-81.
68. Id. at 681.
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suggestions. '69
The Court erred, however, in generalizing that the union's sole interest in
bargaining over both the decision itself and the effects thereof is "job secur-
ity."'70 A union given the opportunity to bargain with respect to a closing
decision could offer concessions, information, and alternatives in an effort to
forestall or halt the closing. A union, however, that was given only the oppor-
tunity to engage in good faith bargaining over the effects of a partial closing
decision already made might choose instead to focus its efforts on getting the
employer to provide pension benefits, severance pay, or retraining and reem-
ployment programs for the discharged workers so as to minimize the impact of
the termination of the operation.7t This would be especially true when labor
costs had little or no effect on the closing decision, thus limiting the degree to
which the union could make concessions.72
Another curious aspect of the Court's opinion is its analysis of FNM's
interest in having free rein to make its unilateral partial termination decision
without having to bargain with the union over the issue. The Court never
identified the specific interest in question, although it discussed in general
terms management's need for speed, secrecy, and flexibility in decision mak-
ing.73 One might surmise that the Court believed that bargaining in this case
would have been futile, 74 because the dispute was solely over the size of the
management fee paid by Greenpark to FNM, and "the union had no control
or authority of that fee" since it was paid by a third party, Greenpark. 75 At
the same time, the Court may have thought that because of the importance of
the management decision involved,76 it was unnecessary to inquire whether
bargaining would actually encroach on management interest; the potential for
such an encroachment is enough.77 Ultimately, the Court hinted that the real
inquiry is whether the decision represents a "significant change" in the em-
ployer's operation.78 What is the effect of the decision on the employer's busi-
ness? The employer's duty to bargain will thus be determined by examining
69. Id.
70. Id
71. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 582 F.2d at 736.
72. The Court recognized that when labor costs are a major cause of the operation's unprofit-
ability, management will have an incentive to approach labor voluntarily in an attempt to seek
concessions and thereby restore the operation to a profitable status. 452 U.S. at 682. The Court
also noted, however, that this will be true only if "the subject proposed for discussion is amenable
to resolution through the bargaining process." Id. at 678 (emphasis added). In Fibreboard, on the
other hand, the Court said that "although it is not possible to say whether a satisfactory resolution
could be reached, national labor policy is founded upon the congressional determination that the
chances are good enough to warrant subjecting such issues [i.e., those effecting cost savings by
contracting out work] to the process of collective negotiation." 379 U.S. at 214.
73. 452 U.S. at 682-86.
74. The Court noted that management "may have no feasible alternative to closing, and even
good faith bargaining over it may be both futile and cause the employer additional loss." Id. at
683 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, "Partial Terminations"- Choice Between Equality
and Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1089 (1967).
75. 452 U.S. at 687.
76. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
77. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 582 F.2d at 741-50 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
78. The absence of significant investment or withdrawal of capital is not determinative.
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where the decision falls along the continuum between the decision in First
National ("not unlike opening a new line of business or going completely out
of business entirely") 79 and that in Fibreboard ("the replacement of employees
in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do
the same work under similar conditions of employment"). 80 If this is in fact
what the Court has proposed, then its balancing of interests approach will do
little to clarify the confusion surrounding this issue. The Court has merely
shifted the inquiry from the proper test to apply to the proper factors to con-
sider in applying its balancing test.
The Court appears to have incorporated in the application of its balanc-
ing of interests test a per se rule that an employer will never have a duty to
bargain over a decision to terminate part of its operation. A per se rule may be
the result of the Court's opinion, because the benefit to the collective bargain-
ing process that would come from the union's participation in the bargaining
process would always be, at least in the Court's view, negligible, since the
union's interest in such a decision would always be to protect the job security
of its employee-members. Management, on the other hand, has an important
interest in making its business decisions, and that interest would be en-
croached upon without corresponding benefit if it were required to bargain
with the union about the decision before making it. Such a per se rule, of
course, furthers the Court's stated objective of reducing the confusion existing
between the Board and the courts of appeal. But the Court, apparently not
satisfied with such a simple rule, chose to fashion a balancing test indicating
how that test is to be applied in cases involving similar types of decisions, such
as the decision to relocate and the decision to subcontract out work.8'
Finally, the balancing approach employed by the Court also appears to be
inconsistent with its "affect" analysis introduced in Teamsters Union v. Oli-
ver.82 In that case a collective bargaining agreement was negotiated in the
trucking industry which established a minimum rental that carriers would pay
to truck owners who drove their own vehicles as independent contractors in
place of a carrier's own employee-drivers. Although the Court did not decide
whether the owner-drivers were "employees" within the meaning of the Act,8 3
it did hold that the minimum rental fee was a mandatory subject of bargain-
Rather, the important question is whether the decision represented a significant change in the
scope of the operations. 252 U.S. at 688.
79. Id.
80. 379 U.S. at 215.
81. Until now, the Board and the courts had treated partial termination, subcontracting, and
relocation decisions in a similar manner. See Murphy, supra note 34. at 15-19. But in First Na-
tional the Supreme Court "intimate[d] no view as to other types of management decisions, such as
plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered
on their particular facts." 452 U.S. at 686 n.22. Arguably, the balancing approach is to be applied
to at least those types of management decisions. The Court, however, implied that the interests
considered in each application will vary depending on the particular situation involved. Thus that
the Court did not intend to establish a per se rule that an employer never has a duty to bargain
over a partial closing decision is clear.
82. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
83. Id.
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ing, because it was integrally related to the establishment of a stable wage
structure for clearly covered employee-drivers, and therefore "affected" the
"terms and conditions" of the latter group's employment.
84
The Court tacitly adopted this "affect" doctrine as one of the bases for its
holding in Fibreboard.85 It modified the doctrine slightly in A/lied Chemical
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. ,86 in which it held that the employer did
not have a duty to bargain over retirees' pension benefits because they were
outside the scope of the employment relationship between management and
the existing employees, 87 and because the question did not vitally affect the
terms and conditions of employment of the currently active employees.88
On the other hand, the balancing of interests approach adopted by the
Court in First National arguably can be reconciled with the Court's "affect"
doctrine.89 The balancing approach can be viewed as a supplementary test
designed further to limit statutorily mandated bargaining over management
decisions that fall outside the scope of the employment relationship-the ter-
mination of employment. Mandatory bargaining would thus be limited to
those decisions in which the benefit to the collective bargaining process from
the improved flow of information in the decision-making process offset the
burden that such a duty would place on management's need to make such
decisions freely. 90 In sum, the Court, through its balancing test, may have
created an additional "safeguard" to protect management's autonomy in mak-
ing decisions outside the direct employer-employee relationship.
The Supreme Court's decision in First National reached a pragmatic re-
sult. The employer, FNM, decided to terminate its Greenpark operation
solely because the reduced management fee made the contract unprofitable, a
cause wholly unrelated to FNM's relationship with its Greenpark employees.
No doubt the Court was concerned' that if an employer is held to have a duty
to bargain about such a decision merely because the union could offer conces-
sions and alternatives that would restore the Greenpark contract to a profita-
84. Id. at 294-95.
85. 379 U.S. at 212-13. The Court noted in Fibreboard that the only difference between the
situation there and the one faced by the Court in Oliver was that "the work of the employees in the
bargaining unit was let out piecemeal in Oliver, whereas here the work of the entire unit has been
contracted out." Id. at 213.
86. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
87. Id. at 163-71. Specifically, the Court found that the retired workers were not "employ-
ees" within the meaning of the Act. Section 2(3) of the Act defines the term "employee" to include
"any employee, and [it] shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise .. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
88. 404 U.S. at 182.
89. The phrase "affect doctrine" refers to the Court's analysis in Oliver, as modified in Allied
Chemical Workers to include only those matters that "vitally affect" a term of condition of em-
ployment. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
90. The Court in First National expressly noted that it was addressing a question involving
only one of the three general types of management decisions -one having as its focus the eco-
nomic profitability of the operation, yet also having a direct impact on employment since layoffs
are an unavoidable by-product of the decision. 452 U.S. at 677. Because of management's need to
be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent necessary to run a profitable
business, bargaining about such a decision will be required only when justified by more significant
countervailing interests. Id. at 678-79.
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ble status, then no economically motivated management decision would be
beyond the duty to bargain. Such a result would be untenable in a free enter-
prise system in view of management's need for freedom and certainty in its
decision-making process.9 1 The Court agreed to consider First National with
the stated intention of settling the disagreement between the Board and the
courts of appeal on the duty to bargain over decisions that are motivated
solely by economic concerns. 92 The Court failed to do so, however, because it
adopted a balancing test that weighs dubious interests of uncertain definition
93
to reach what might be a per se rule that an employer has no duty to bargain
about an economically motivated partial termination decision. 94 The Court
then qualified that apparent rule and in dicta cast further doubt on principles
traditionally applied by the Board, the courts of appeal, and even the Supreme
Court in similar cases. 95 In sum, though the narrow holding of First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB is a correct and pragmatic one, the Court failed
in its primary task of clarifying a very muddled area of the law. Its confused
application of a vague balancing of interests test is more likely to distort than
to focus the issue.
96
WILLIAM R. WHITEHURST
91. The Court appears to have placed a premium on management's need for unencumbered
decision-making powers if it is to run a profitable business. Id
92. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
96. For the Board's first application of the Court's decision in First National, see Bob's Big
Boy Family Restaurants, a Division of Marriott Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 111 L.R.R.M. 1354
(Sept. 30, 1982). The Board seemed to read First National very narrowly when it concluded that a
restaurant supplier's subcontracting of its'shrimp packaging operation did not amount to a partial
closing and that the supplier, therefore, had a duty to bargain.
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